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Abstract
This article examines the nature and implications of the emerging EU–Russia competition in their common neighbour-
hood. After analysing the two economic integration platforms that the EU and Russia are respectively promoting in the
postsoviet space, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and the Eurasian Economic Union, the discussion focuses on the case
study of Ukraine. It is argued that depicting this emerging regional conﬁguration as a geopolitical contest between
two cohesive blocs was not fully corresponding to the reality on the ground but that it largely turned into a self-fulﬁlling
prophecy in the case of Ukraine.
Policy Implications
• The EU should de-emphasize the regional aspect of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to focus instead on
countries individually.
• The EU should seek to develop its assessment capacities of the preferences and calculations of domestic actors on
the ground. It should also set up epistemic networks to analyse how the strategic, political and economic structures
speciﬁc to the countries of the neighbourhood contribute to shape these preferences.
• The EU should attempt to deﬁne more clearly its interests towards the region and stick closely to its values. This
would contribute to send a signal to local elites and societies as well as to Russia.
had been met and the EU Commission had signalled its
readiness to sign the agreement. When backtracking from
this process, the Ukrainian government invoked matters
of national security and the will to preserve good trade
relations with Russia. Not least as it hopes to see Ukraine
join its own regional integration format, the Eurasian Eco-
nomic Union, Russia had been actively attempting to dis-
courage the Ukrainian authorities from engaging in closer
association with the EU, paralysing for instance Ukraine–
Russia trade relations in the summer of 2013 by imposing
increased controls and restrictions at the border. A couple
of weeks after rejecting the trade pact with the EU, the
Ukrainian president signed instead a deal with Russia com-
prising a promised $15bn aid package and reduced gas
prices. The context of this decision was thus one of a
growing geo-economic competition between the EU and
Russia over their common neighbourhood.
This article examines the nature and implications of
this competition. It analyses in particular the type of
power and of strategies deployed by the two actors in
the region as well as the conditions that led the situation
On 21 November 2013, the Ukrainian government 
announced that it would not sign the Association Agree-
ment (AA) that had been negotiated for years with the 
EU and that was ready to be signed at the Eastern Part-
nership (EaP) Summit held one week later. This volte-face 
opened up a chain of events that had dramatic conse-
quences for the Ukrainian state itself and for the region 
more broadly: the rejection of the AA prompted a protest 
movement which eventually brought down the govern-
ment; a new government was formed around some of 
the main political ﬁgures in the protests, including some 
nationalist elements; denouncing the new government as 
illegitimate and as threatening to the Russian-speaking 
population of Ukraine, Russia intervened militarily in Cri-
mea and eventually annexed it. It appears thus crucial to 
understand the nature, context and determinants of this 
November 2013 decision.
The AA is a contractual scheme that constitutes the 
most advanced stage of economic integration with the EU 
that noncandidate countries can reach. Ukraine was poised 
to be the ﬁrst country to do so: the technical requirements
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to escalate in the case of Ukraine. It examines how Russia
came to feel sufﬁciently threatened by what appears to
be, at ﬁrst glance, a rather modest and overly bureau-
cratic EU initiative, the Eastern Partnership; it tries to
explain how the rivalry between two economic integra-
tion regimes led to an escalation in coercive diplomacy,
political revolution, military intervention and territorial
seizure. I argue that what was in reality a geo-economic
(or a structural power) competition eventually turned
into a geopolitical struggle, after being perceived and
characterized as such and because of the speciﬁcities of
the Ukrainian context. This geopolitical narrative of a
clash between two blocs or spheres of inﬂuence not only
failed to account for the essence and actual possibilities
of EU power in the region, for the scope of instruments
originally mobilized by Moscow and for the complexity
of the situation on the ground. It also led Brussels to
somehow overlook the preferences and calculations of
local actors, it seemingly led Moscow to perceive the AA
as a stepping stone to NATO membership and it allowed
the Yanukovych government to play the two regional
actors against one another in a will to maximize its geo-
political rent, without however implementing much
needed domestic reforms.
It is the basic contention of this article that this new
conﬁguration of rival regional frameworks can shed light
on two core debates in the study of EU external rela-
tions, namely on EU actorness and on the nature of EU
power. On the one hand, the presence and actions of a
regional competitor provides an opportunity to assess
the cohesiveness and authority of EU foreign policy. On
the other hand, the fact that countries of the neighbour-
hood are offered an alternative integration scheme will
tell about the attractiveness of its model and about its
ability to shape the rules of regional politics.
The EU and Russia’s respective policies towards their
common neighbourhood will be analysed in this light.
The ﬁrst part will present the modalities and investigate
the impact of EU policies through the EaP initiative. The
second part will explore why Russia felt threatened by
this policy and how it came to develop its own integra-
tion scheme in response. The implications of this compe-
tition will then be discussed with reference to the case
study of Ukraine. The conclusion will formulate some rec-
ommendations for EU policies in this evolving context.
The EU’s EaP initiative
The EaP initiative directed at the six postsoviet countries
of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus is one of the two
regional legs of the European Neighbourhood Policy
(ENP).1 Launched in 2004, the ENP seeks to encourage
the ‘economic integration and political association’ of the
neighbouring counties with the EU (European Commis-
sion, 2004). More concretely, the ENP aims at fostering
domestic reforms in the political, economic and adminis-
trative realms by offering in exchange privileged access
to the internal market, ﬁnancial aid and visa facilitations.
At its origins, the creation of the ENP was mainly moti-
vated by geopolitical considerations: stabilizing the Euro-
pean peripheries and laying the foundations of an EU
foreign policy beyond enlargement. The EU was looking
to capitalize on the successful experience of spurring
and shaping central Europe’s transformation through the
enlargement process, and this even though, in the con-
text of ‘enlargement fatigue’ that prevailed after the
mid-2000s, accession was less and less available for
neighbouring countries (Rupnik, 2007). By relying on con-
ditionality incentives in interacting with its new Eastern
periphery, the EU has been attempting to reproduce the
logic at heart in enlargement – fostering peace and
stability in its immediate environment by exporting its
internal model – without its main prize, membership.
The EaP was born out of a will to regionalize ENP
programs and instruments. The EU member states that
pushed for this initiative – Poland ﬁrst and foremost,
with the support of other central European countries
such as the Czech Republic but also of Sweden – were
hoping to single out Eastern Europe as a region on the
EU foreign policy radar. Several reasons explain this Pol-
ish and central European activism, some deriving from
the geographical, historical and socioeconomic ties these
countries have with the Eastern neighbourhood and
some linked to their own intra-European objectives as
carving for themselves a niche of specialization within EU
structures was a way to increase their agenda setting
capacities in Brussels (Cadier and Parmentier, 2011). To
be sure, central European countries stand among the EU
member states that are the most critical of Russia
(although to varying degrees) and some of their policy
makers might have perceived the EaP as an occasion to
develop a rollback policy against Russia’s inﬂuence or at
least came to present it as such in domestic debates and
private conversations (Cadier, 2012). The actual policy
output does not correspond to such a scheme however
as to be adopted and uploaded at the EU level, the EaP
had to be re-designed in administrative rather than polit-
ical terms and infused with a good deal of constructive
ambiguity (Copsey and Pomorska, 2010). The coming
into being of the EaP was not totally disjointed from
developments linked to Russia as it is in the ofﬁcial reso-
lution adopted in reaction to the Russo-Georgian conﬂict
of August 2008 that the European Council asked the
Commission to accelerate the set up of this policy (Euro-
pean Council, 2008). Yet, this should be less read as a
retaliatory move or strategic response to the conﬂict
than as the outcome of intra-European bargaining: the
member states advocating the imposition of sanctions
against Russia after the conﬂict (Poland, Sweden, the UK,
the Baltic states) accepted that they would not to see
Global Policy (2014) 5:Suppl.1
EU–Russia Competition and the Ukraine Crisis 77
2013), which not only subjectivises the analytical focus
but also fails to account for the fact that the ENP is not
always ‘soft’ or ‘normative’ in its impact or implementa-
tion (Tocci, 2008). In fact, to capture this aspect, some
authors have talked of regional normative hegemony
(Haukkala, 2010) or of empire by example (Zielonka,
2008). Thus, in light of these limitations, the concept of
‘structural power’ as developed by Susan Strange will be
preferred here. Structural power refers to the ‘power to
shape and determine the structures of the [regional]
political economy within which other states, their political
institutions and their economic enterprises’ have to oper-
ate (Strange, 1994, pp. 24–25). In addition, the notion of
‘unintended power’, brieﬂy sketched by Zaki La€ıdi (2007),
will be useful to capture the idea (mentioned above) that
the kind of power generated by the EaP cannot hardly be
meticulously harnessed and speciﬁcally directed.
Another strand of literature approaches the ENP from
an implementation perspective, notably analysing its
reception by partner countries and assessing the ability of
the EU to foster change in the Eastern neighbourhood
(Delcour and Tulmets, 2008). To be sure, the ENP cannot
be said to have successfully fostered large-scale political
change across the region nor to have durably installed EU
values at its core: on the contrary, according to freedom
house indicators, political rights and civil liberties have
backslid in all the EaP countries but Moldova between
2006 and 2011 (Longhurst and Wojna, 2011). Nevertheless,
empirical studies on the reception and impact of the
ENP ﬁnd some degree of compliance with EU demands
and convergence towards EU standards has happened in
several partner countries (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig,
2009; Wolczuk, 2009).
The recent special volume edited by Tanja B€orzel and
Julia Langbein is useful in particular for our focus here as
it identiﬁes the speciﬁc circumstances under which the
ENP has been successful in fostering change in the East-
ern neighbourhood. They ﬁnd that compliance with EU
demands and convergence with EU standards is above all
policy speciﬁc and that it happens regardless of member-
ship prospects or of the degree of asymmetric interde-
pendence with the EU (Langbein and B€orzel, 2013). In
other words, in the same country, the EU might be able
to foster policy change in one sector but not in another
and, across countries, convergence is not guaranteed in
states with membership aspirations (e.g. Moldova or
Georgia) nor is it precluded in states with low interdepen-
dence with the EU (e.g. Armenia). European transforma-
tive power is not only composite in terms of its impact
but also in terms of its sources: the same study ﬁnds
that other actors beyond the EU inﬂuence policy change
in the neighborhood (e.g. multinational corporations,
national governments, donor organizations) and that the
Russian involvement itself is not unitary (Langbein and
B€orzel, 2013). Most interestingly, other studies from the
such sanctions imposed in exchange for a faster estab-
lishment of the EaP.
While geopolitical considerations were not totally 
absent in the context and sources at the origins of the 
EaP, the actual policy outcome can hardly be described 
as a ‘geopolitical instrument’ in the sense of the tradi-
tional tool of power politics. The spectrum of possibilities 
of the EaP is limited by its meagre budget endowment 
(€600 million) but also by the nature of its instruments 
(Whitman and Wolff, 2010). To foster domestic reforms 
towards the approximation of EU norms and standards, 
the ENP relies on a combination of conditionality incen-
tives and socialization mechanisms. The incentives 
offered through bilateral contracts to the partners can be 
summed up by the so-called ‘three Ms’: Money (ﬁnancial 
aid and loans), Markets (sectorial access to the EU inter-
nal market) and Mobility (visa facilitation). The third 
aspect constitutes the greatest ‘soft power’ asset for the 
EU with regard to the populations of the countries con-
cerned while the second aspect, which is meant to cul-
minate in the signing of a Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), represents the greatest 
perspective in terms of economic development. Both 
however require enormous effort in terms of technical 
and legislative harmonization with the EU acquis comm-
unautaire, which governments of the region are often 
reluctant to bear if they judge the potential beneﬁts 
insufﬁcient.
In sum, it is important to stress that the EaP is a slow 
and long-term process: it consists of a progressive and 
monitored approximation of EU benchmarks and rests a 
great deal on the will of local governments and elites to 
attain that goal. In other words, it hardly constitutes a 
robotic arm that the EU can use for immediate and direc-
ted leverage, a fortiori in a crisis situation. What kind of 
impact then has the EU had in the Eastern neighbour-
hood? How successful has it been in fostering change in 
the region? These questions, central to the study of EU 
external relations, have served as respective guides for 
research to two strands of academic literature on the 
ENP.2
A ﬁrst body of literature approaches the ENP as a case 
study to contribute to the ongoing inquiry on the nature 
of EU power (civilian, normative, soft, ethical. . .).3 In light 
of the type of instruments described above and of the 
kind of inﬂuence they generate, the concept of normative 
power seems particularly ﬁt to capture the ENP (La€ıdi, 
2008; Manners, 2010). If indeed norms are deﬁned as 
implicit or explicit principles, rules and expectations of 
behaviour, then the EU is acting as a normative power in 
the neighbourhood in the sense that it promotes there a 
system of norms to discipline and induce predictability in 
the behaviours of regional actors. However, this notion 
has too often come to be associated with the issue of 
legitimacy and with the idea of ‘doing good’ (Sjursen,
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same collection ﬁnd that Russia’s impact does not neces-
sarily defuse the EU’s transformative power in the Eastern
neighborhood but that it can both weaken or strengthen
convergence with EU standards (Ademmer and B€orzel,
2013). In some cases, it even happened according to
Langbein (2013) that some Russian businesses empow-
ered domestic reform-minded actors in an effort to
circumvent rent-seeking elites, while in other cases
strong trade ties with Russian markets have reduced the
incentive to approximate EU internal market norms and
standards.
In summary, the EaP constitutes neither a robotic arm
of EU structural power nor a cohesive sphere of inﬂu-
ence. The EU’s transformative power is potent but
incremental, composite, largely unspeciﬁc and, thereby,
difﬁcult to direct and use instrumentally.
Russia’s Eurasian EU project
Examining Russia’s new regionalization schemes and
analysing their implications for the EU requires ﬁrst to
put them in the broader context of Moscow’s policies
towards the postsoviet space. The region has traditionally
been a zone of strategic importance for Russia – yet it
has featured unequally in its foreign policy strategy. At
the beginning of the 1990s, when Russia was absorbed
with its own transition, the region was ranking rather
low among Moscow’s priorities. Rather than a successful
integration framework, the Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States ended up being a mechanism facilitating the
transition of postsoviet states away from Russia, which
could not handle them anymore.
Following two sets of events and as of the mid-2000s,
Moscow will however seek to reinforce its strategic posi-
tion in the region. First, NATO’s enlargement and military
intervention in Kosovo in 1999, undertaken regardless of
Russia’s strong opposition, came as a reality check for
Russian policy makers with regard to their actual clout
on European affairs – ‘Russia, for the ﬁrst time in
250 years, had ceased to be a power in Europe’ (Trenin,
2009, p. 9). Second and most importantly, the 2004
Orange Revolution in Ukraine, which was largely inter-
preted in Moscow as a western coup threatening Russia’s
interests in the region, had the effect of an electroshock
on Russia’s foreign policy and led it to consolidate its
presence in its ‘near abroad’. The revenues generated by
the inﬂation of hydrocarbons’ prices and the politiciza-
tion of the energy instrument both allowed, and were
used, for this new policy. Many saw Russia’s military
intervention in Georgia in August 2008 as the paragon of
this much-commented ‘new assertiveness’. It should be
noted however that in fact this conﬂict had in itself little
repercussions on EU–Russia relations (no dramatic
disruption) or on the rest of the region (no escalation
around the other frozen conﬂicts). Stated differently, this
conﬂict did not solve the question of how the EU should
approach Russia, as it remained, at the same time, a
‘ﬁerce competitor and an indispensable partner’ (Hassner,
2008, p. 251; Light, 2008).
A noteworthy development in this regard was Russia’s
vehement reaction to the launch of the EaP in 2009. Mos-
cow condemned this new EU initiative in terms that had
until then been reserved for NATO.4 Although it was con-
ﬁned to the level of rhetoric, such animadversion appears
quite puzzling since, as was emphasized, the EaP is a rather
modest bureaucratic initiative that mainly regionalizes
instruments that already existed in the ENP framework.
Analysing this reaction, and later on Russia’s develop-
ment of its own integration schemes, requires ﬁrst to
clearly identify Russia’s interests in the region; regional
inﬂuence is not an end in itself but serves a purpose. As
argued by Dmitri Trenin, this space should be
approached as Russia’s sphere of ‘interests’ rather than of
‘inﬂuence’. He distinguishes three sets of interests: polit-
ico-military (e.g. military bases, generating diplomatic
support from the region), economic (e.g. trade, energy,
labour migration) and societal (language, minorities)
(Trenin, 2009, pp. 12–13).
The ﬁrst set of interests is of crucial strategic impor-
tance to Moscow. Russia’s readiness to intervene mili-
tarily in – and eventually annex – Crimea to secure its
naval base in Sebastopol illustrates that it will not hesi-
tate to use every means to defend them. The concern
for ‘strategic depth’ at the heart of Russia’s security cul-
ture (Tsypkin, 2009, p. 791) leads Moscow to seek to
maintain by all means some kind of buffer zone at its
borders – NATO troops and bases in Ukraine is the abso-
lute redline for Russian strategists. The participation of
Ukraine in NATO’s Steadfast Jazz exercise in November
2013 or the perception that the signature of the AA
would pave the way to the EU and, eventually, NATO
membership are sometimes evoked as having prompted
the radicalization of Russia’s position in the recent crisis.
The EU does not, however, threaten this speciﬁc set of
interests: the EaP has been deprived of its political com-
ponents and, in fact, Moscow had tolerated the deploy-
ment of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
missions in Moldova and Georgia. Rather, it is with
regard to Moscow’s economic and societal interests in
the region that the EaP has been perceived as a poten-
tial threat. Russia’s reaction to this underdeveloped initia-
tive testiﬁes to its growing awareness of the long-term
transformative potential of EU structural power. This reali-
zation not only led Russia to try to defuse the EaP as a
platform for and conveyer of this structural power but
also to develop a new set of policies.
The strong opposition to the EaP has indeed to be
read in the context of a structural trend in Russia’s foreign
policy thinking: as of the late 2000s, Moscow has increas-
ingly been viewing ‘international relations as an arena
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this even though the Treaty establishing this new body
has been signed on the 29 of May 2014. The EEU is to
build on the integrative steps developed through the
ECU, which saw the progressive set up of a common cus-
toms framework (tariff, territory and code) and the formal
establishment of a single economic space. As regards the
latter, the creation of a uniﬁed market for goods is well
advanced (except for energy) but little or no progress
has been made with regard to the free movement of ser-
vices, capitals and labour. Thus, at the time of writing,
this regionalization dynamic is better described as
advanced coordination and progressive harmonization
rather than fully ﬂedged economic integration. Coordina-
tion and harmonization is ensured through two institu-
tions: the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, which
reunites the heads of states and set the long-term goals
of the ECU, and the Eurasian Economic Commission, a
regulatory body overseeing implementation of the regu-
lations on tariffs and which is composed of the deputy
prime ministers of the three member states.
In their economic rationales and institutional design,
the ECU and the EEU seem to have been partly modelled
on the EU – this in fact has been made explicit by Putin
(2011). In other words, these integration projects have
developed both in reaction to and drawing inspiration
from EU policies. Putin claims however that EEU integra-
tion ‘proceed at a much faster pace’ and will be in a
‘position not to repeat [EU] mistakes’ (Putin, 2011). How-
ever, many analysts do not share President Putin’s opti-
mism. World Bank economist David Tarr (Tarr, 2012)
found that the ECU, as it stood, has had a negative
rather than positive effect on Kazakhstan’s economy
while Stefan Meister (Meister, 2013, p. 12) has argued
that the ‘EEU makes little economic sense’ even for
Russia but that Moscow is pursuing this path out of a will
to comfort its self-image as a great power, which remains
crucial to the domestic legitimization of ruling elites.5
Historical grievances, the asymmetry in power and
ambition between Russia and the other members, and
the nature of Russia’s political regime are regularly raised
as potential major impediments. Some analysts argue
these considerations are greatly exaggerated (Bordachev
et al., 2013) while Julian Cooper (2013) has found, in his
historical analysis of these projects’ institutional develop-
ments, that Russia is not the only member pushing for
economic integration and that Kazakhstan in particular
was able to inﬂuence the process. The way the accession
negotiations have been conducted with Armenia how-
ever, i.e. mainly in a secretive formats between the
Russian and Armenian presidents and on the basis of
trade-offs between Moscow’s desire to see Armenia join
the EEU and Yerevan’s demand for security guarantees
from Moscow (Delcour, 2014), have been putting strain
on the economic and multilateral nature of the project,
as might also the recent attempt by Russia, following the
for competition between value systems’ (Thorun, 2009, 
p. 79). One of the conclusions drawn from the Orange 
revolution was the pressing need for Russia to ‘master 
the western tools of legitimizing the political processes in 
the post Soviet space’ (Frolov, 2005, p. 176). Russia has 
thus attempted to ‘rebrand itself’ and engaged in a strat-
egy of contesting, reformulating and promoting interna-
tional norms (Makarychev, 2008), while continuing to rely 
in parallel on classical levers of hard power (e.g. military 
build-up in Abkhazia). What was originally above all a 
rhetorical strategy will become a fully ﬂedged attempt to 
increasingly shape the rules of regional politics and to 
develop its own structural power in reaction to that of 
the EU.
This clearly transpires from the Eurasian Customs Union 
(ECU) initiative launched in 2010 and from the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EEU) project announced for 2015. These 
consecrate a multipolar vision underpinned by the con-
viction that, to be successful, major powers increasingly 
need to be able to rely on regional pedestals built around 
their own norms and standards. In the article where he 
announced the EEU, Vladimir Putin (2011) argued that 
21st century global politics calls for closer economic inte-
gration and sets the EEU on course to become a ‘power-
ful supranational association capable of becoming one of 
the poles in the modern world’. Although largely under-
pinned by a geopolitical vision, the emphasis had been, 
until the Ukraine crisis, placed not on historical consider-
ations or political values but on the potential moderniza-
tion and economic beneﬁts to be achieved through the 
progressive harmonization of standards, regulations and 
practices. The fact is that the shock of the economic crisis 
of 2008–2009 not only led Russia to seek to reinvigorate 
its economy by securing new markets in the postsoviet 
space but also actually led some countries of the region 
to consider seriously these new integration schemes.
The EEU is ﬁrst to be built around the current mem-
bers of the ECU (Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) and 
then hopes to enlarge to other countries. Armenia and 
Kirghizstan have opened membership talks while Tajiki-
stan has expressed interest. Ukraine’s membership was 
obviously a key objective for Moscow and the recent 
developments in the country ought to be read in this 
background. Notwithstanding the legitimate scepticism 
as regards its viability and chances of success (see 
below), experts describe the ECU as an ambitious 
attempt on the part of Moscow to build a ‘modern, rule-
based institutional framework in bringing economic ben-
eﬁts’ (Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2013, p. 2). Thus the actual 
scope, content and objectives of this initiative – which 
remains understudied – deserve closer scrutiny to be 
able to assess its implications for the region, for Russia 
and for the EU.
At this stage, a good deal of uncertainty remains as 
regards the ﬁnal institutional architecture of the EEU and
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Ukrainian crisis, to turn the EEU into a foreign policy tool.
Finally, an even more acute issue relates to the domestic
implementation of what is eminently a top-down initia-
tive and to the question of whether, in light of the
region’s Rule of Law record and practices, member states
will fully abide by the rules they set for themselves
(Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2013, p. 5). The interests, prefer-
ences and reform capacity of domestic actors will be
determinants in this regard.
In summary, Moscow came to see the EaP as a threat
to its economic interests in the common neighbourhood
but also, to some extent, to its political interests as it
remains concerned with preserving the region as a stra-
tegic buffer zone. In response to that of the EU, Russia
has attempted to develop its own structural power
through the ECU and EEU initiatives, which in spite of
several structural ﬂaws represent genuine attempts at
establishing an economic integration regime. The devel-
opments in Ukraine, where Moscow has resorted to coer-
cive diplomacy to prevent Kiev from signing the AA with
the EU, illustrate the limit of these initiatives.
Analysing Ukraine’s decision
The fact that the EaP and the EEU are directed at the
same countries raises questions regarding the implica-
tions of this collision for the region and for EU–Russia
relations. Several commentators had predicted that these
competing offers of regional economic integration would
lead the EU and Russia to clash over their common
neighbourhood without specifying however how they
negatively affect each other or how they could lead to
conﬂict. The recent events in Ukraine have shed light on
these questions and it is crucial to examine whether their
causes are structural or speciﬁc to the country. The
November 2013 decision to reject the AA in particular
ought to be put in context and closely analysed.
In spite of the prevalent narrative, just as the rivalry
between the EaP and EEU formats was not correspond-
ing to a geopolitical clash between two cohesive blocs,
Ukraine had not necessarily been faced with a binary
choice between East and West. In fact, the Ukrainian
leadership had for years made its strategy precisely to
consistently avoid making such a choice (Gnedina and
Sleptsova, 2012). From his re-election in 2010 onwards,
President Yanukovych had purportedly cultivated ambi-
guity on the geopolitical orientation of his country,
choosing Brussels for his ﬁrst state visit but extending a
few weeks later the lease of Russia’s naval base in Cri-
mea. By playing the two regional actors off one another,
Yanukovych had aimed to raise the stakes and maximize
its potential advantages and beneﬁts;6 neither by origi-
nally indicating his readiness to sign the AA nor by
eventually rejecting it did the former President make a
deﬁnite choice. Rather than as an agenda for reform or
an embracement of the European model, he seemed
solely interested in the AA for ﬁnancial reasons and ‘as a
means of continuing its balancing act between the EU
and Russia’ (Stewart, 2014, p. 5). Similarly, while he even-
tually rejected it and signed instead a ﬁnancial deal with
Moscow, Yanukovych was careful not to pledge to join
the ECU (in spite of Moscow’s pressure).
Even the protest movements (known as the Maidan)
that followed Yanukovych’s decision and eventually
deposed him cannot be read solely as a breaking point
caused by an East–West polarization. Although caution is
required when analysing these movements, several
experts from (or on) the region have been guarding
against media simpliﬁcation of a pro-EU vs pro-Russia
standoff and emphasized instead that the protests had
less to do with the relationship to these two regional
actors than with the domestic situation of corrupt and
mismanaged governance.7
In analysing Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to withdraw
from the AA process, it appears thus essential to devote
instead close attention to the domestic variables. Two
short-term imperatives seem to have motivated his deci-
sion in particular: securing his re-election in 2015 and
addressing Ukraine’s dire economic situation. The ﬁrst
was made especially pressing by the very nature of the
country’s political system as an electoral defeat would
not simply mean losing power but also the wealth he
had accumulated and also potentially his freedom (as
the case of Yulia Tymoshenko testiﬁes).
The second imperative related to the country’s econ-
omy, which was facing risk of recession, budget and
current account deﬁcits and a plunge of foreign
reserves.8 A ﬁnancial aid package injecting money into
Ukraine’s economy was not just needed to counteract
the effects of Russia’s trade restrictions (which were mak-
ing the situation worse) but also, more profoundly, to
address these structural problems. Its own resources
being limited following the eurozone crisis, the EU was
committed to facilitating the granting of such ﬁnancial
support through the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
for an amount which was said to be in the region of
$15bn (i.e. equivalent to what Yanukovych will obtain
from Moscow). This loan however was conditioned on
a set of reforms – such as the rationalization of the
domestic gas market (increasing domestic prices and rec-
tifying management structures) and ﬁscal consolidation
(decreasing wages in the public sector)9 – which would
have led to an increase in the cost of living and to
potentially alienating the country’s oligarchs, in other
words jeopardizing Yanukovych’s chances of re-election.
Out of economic calculations and short-termism, the
former Ukrainian president opted for the Russian offer
which not only was not conditioned on structural
reforms but which also would lead to a lift of the trade
restrictions imposed by Moscow.
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tions to grow suspicious of the new power in Kiev and,
most importantly, prompted Moscow to seize upon this
sentiment to foster unrest in the East and to intervene in
Crimea. A third turning point has been the organization
of a referendum in Crimea and the annexing of this
region into the Russian Federation. This marks a depar-
ture from the previous Russian policy of incremental
coercive diplomacy (conditioned offer of ﬁnancial
aid, trade restrictions, military exercises at the border and
covert military operations) to a geopolitical move of
territorial seizure.
Lessons from the Ukraine crisis and policy
recommendations for the EU
The structural power (or geo-economic) rivalry between
the EaP and EEU platforms prompted a chain of events
that culminated in Russia’s annexing of a part of Ukraine’s
territory. The geopolitical narrative, which was in place
before the crisis and which this article has exposed as not
adequately capturing the reality of the regional conﬁgura-
tion, in a way turned into a self-fulﬁlling prophecy.
Full membership of both EaP and EEU structures
would not be possible: there is for instance an incompat-
ibility on the issue of tariffs as the signing of a DCFTA
leads to privileged tariffs with the EU while the ECU
requires its members to have common tariffs towards
external actors (including the EU).13 Yet, it was empha-
sized that presenting these structures as two ‘spheres
of inﬂuence’, in which countries of the region would
irremediably and deﬁnitively fall, does not capture the
complexity of these regionalization schemes or of the sit-
uation on the ground. These schemes are not necessarily
cohesive and comprehensive in their impact and it was
noted that some governing elites, including in Ukraine,
had been adamant in precisely avoiding ﬁnding them-
selves tied up too closely with either of them.
Most importantly, this narrative overlooks the factor
that will be decisive in mediating the impact of these
two regionalization schemes, namely the preferences of
domestic actors. In reviewing both the EaP and the EEU
policies, it was stressed that even more than on the
nature of their offers, their success rested on the strate-
gic, economic and political calculations of domestic
elites. Similarly, the analysis of Viktor Yanukovych’s deci-
sion to withdraw from the AA process showed that
domestic variables (namely the economic situation and
the re-election imperative) were determinant, much more
than considerations of allegiances to either Russia or
the EU.
Nevertheless, policy makers and analysts alike often
characterized this competition as a clash between two
cohesive integration blocs and Ukraine’s choice was
framed as a deﬁnite and binary one. Russian policy makers
certainly seem to have perceived this conﬁguration as
In the context of this decision, the reactions and strat-
egies of Russia and the EU have differed markedly. The 
EU seems to have been largely caught unprepared by 
the Ukrainian authorities’ reversal and adopted a mainly 
passive strategy of maintaining its offer to Ukraine (‘the 
door is still open’).10 Russia, for its part, has not hesitated 
to resort to incremental coercive diplomacy measures 
to put pressure on Ukraine; this policy was mainly one 
of negative compellence however, i.e. of keeping the 
Ukrainian government in check and preventing it from 
signing the AA rather than forcing it to join the ECU or 
installing a pro-Russian government in Kiev. The deal 
signed between Vladimir Putin and Viktor Yanukovych in 
December 2013 illustrates this point: only $3bn out of 
the promised $15bn was lent to Ukraine and the price 
cut on gas imports was to be revised every quarter.11
A series of turning points, however, led to an escala-
tion of the Ukraine crisis and radically altered the conﬁg-
uration on the ground and in the region. These events 
are both well known and rather recent, thus they will 
brieﬂy be presented factually and chronologically. A ﬁrst 
turning point was the repression, by the Ukrainian police, 
of the Maidan Square protesters on the night of the 30 
November 2013, which multiplied the numbers and 
resolve of the movement. The shooting of protesters in 
the third week of February 2014, leaving dozens dead, 
was a second turning point. This prompted the EU to 
send a mediation mission represented by the three for-
eign Ministers of the Weimar Triangle (Germany, France, 
Poland) to negotiate and strike, on the 21 February, a 
political settlement with Viktor Yanukovych and repre-
sentatives of the opposition. According to this Agree-
ment, Yanukovych was to stay in power until the 
organization of national elections in late 2014. It was not 
signed by the Russian envoy present at the talks how-
ever (even though Moscow will subsequently insist on 
Yanukovych being the only legitimate head of the Ukrai-
nian executive) and it was also rejected by the Maidan 
movement who was demanding Yanukovych immediate 
removal from power. In parallel, representatives of the 
Maidan in fact conducted informal talks with some repre-
sentatives of the Ministry of the Interior and obtained an 
agreement to withdraw its special forces.12 This paved 
the way for the demise of the government, and saw the 
parliament take over and President Yanukovych ﬂee the 
country. The parliament passed numerous legislative 
decisions on the weekend of 22 February, including one 
re-enacting the 2004 constitution and one revoking the 
possibility of using languages other than Ukrainian as 
the ofﬁcial language in regions with sizeable minorities. 
The latter, although eventually vetoed by the acting pres-
ident, along with the presence of members from the 
nationalist political factions in the new government and 
the absence of signiﬁcant representatives from the East 
and South Russian-speaking regions, led these popula-
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a zero-sum geopolitical game, as testiﬁed by the arm-
twisting measures imposed on Kiev to prevent the signing
of the AA or by the intervention in Crimea to secure its
strategic assets after the fall of the government. The key
issue is whether the dramatic turn of events in Ukraine
was a direct result of this regional competition and
whether it might trigger similar developments in other
countries of the Eastern neighborhood.
Considering how recent these events are, the pace at
which they happened and the limited information avail-
able, a thorough analysis of their root causes, and thus
of the likelihood of their reproduction in other national
contexts, appear difﬁcult.14 Some points can be nonethe-
less considered in this regard: ﬁrst, the fall of the Ukrai-
nian government has certainly represented a tipping
point for Russia’s strategy, and this can be linked to its
broader wariness of regime change. An interesting count-
erfact would be to consider whether Moscow would
have prompted a similar manufactured crisis in Crimea if
the Yanukovych government had signed the AA. Second,
it should be stressed that no other countries in the
region have a comparable strategic, economic and histor-
ical importance for Russia. For Moscow, preserving its
interests in Ukraine and securing in particular its military
assets in Crimea clearly outweighed the risk of straining
its relations with the West. It is unclear what would be
the outcome of a comparable cost-beneﬁt analysis with
regard to other countries. More generally, it remains to
be seen whether Ukraine was an exceptional case and
whether Russia will attempt to fall back on the kind of
approach it had initially pursued through the ECU and
EEU. There are many chances that the recent events
might increase other members’ sovereignty sensitivities
and put the integration regime under pressure. In many
ways, the developments in Ukraine can be read as a fail-
ure of Russia’s structural power endeavours, since it
resorted instead to classical hard power attributes and
coercive measures.
The analysis of the Ukraine case study also shed light
on EU actorness in regional politics and on the type of
power it deploys in the Eastern neighbourhood. The EU’s
transformative or structural power is far from negligible –
as testiﬁed by Russia’s reaction to it – and can represent
a real asset in shaping Eastern Europe. It can hardly,
however, be instrumentally levered and constituted as a
quick-ﬁre and proactive foreign policy tool. This transfor-
mative process remains not only a slow, incremental and
long-term one but also, and most importantly, the EU’s
structural power remains largely undirected. Through the
ENP, the EU is making a conditioned offer but then it is
up to the partner countries to chose to meet the set
requirements, in other words to accept the offer or not.
This benchmark approach to international relations
derives from the very nature of EU decision-making
structures: it is much easier for member states to ﬁnd
convergence around norms, standards and values rather
than around interests. Thus, by design, the ENP is not ﬁt
as an instrument to advance EU interests – which are
not clearly deﬁned anyway – and can hardly be used to
coerce a country into accepting the EU’s offer.
From these various lessons of the Ukraine crisis, three
sets of policy recommendations can be formulated with
regard to EU strategy towards the Eastern neighbour-
hood. First, the EU should attempt to deﬁne more clearly
its interests towards the region and stick more closely to
its values. The ENP’s transformative power is largely undi-
rected, for reasons pertaining to its design, but also
because the EU’s goals in this regard are not sufﬁciently
speciﬁed. Even if consensus cannot always be reached,
the mere process of approaching the region from this
angle would already have sent a message to Yanukovych
when attempting to play off the EU and Russia against
one another to maximize Ukraine’s regional association
rents. By not properly deﬁning its interests, the EU is also
potentially disserving its values: conveying the impres-
sion that, to ‘win over’ Ukraine in a ‘geopolitical contest’
against Russia, the EU is ready to relax its conditionality
criteria in terms of political and economic reforms would
not only go against the principles on which the ENP is
built but also be counterproductive. The protest move-
ments in Ukraine demonstrated that the EU’s norms and
values are its greatest asset and thus it ought to stay
true to them. Contrary to media reports, these move-
ments were probably not requesting ﬁrst and foremost
the signature of the AA; it remains that what they
demanded for their own country – i.e. good governance,
respect for human dignity and popular sovereignty – is
incarnated in the region by the EU.
Second, the EU should probably de-emphasize the
regional aspect pursued through the EaP to focus instead
on countries individually. The ENP is a multi-level, incre-
mental, and differentiated process and its impact is pol-
icy-speciﬁc and above all bilateral. Not only has this
regional dimension fed captious discursive characteriza-
tions of a contest between two blocs and prompted
Russian reactions, it has also failed in its original objec-
tive of upgrading the visibility of the postsoviet space on
EU foreign policy radar. The priority for the EU should be
to reinforce the Ukrainian state so as to reduce its vul-
nerability to Russia’s pressures.
Last, and most importantly, the EU should focus on
better understanding the domestic contexts (actors, pref-
erences and dynamics) of the countries of the Eastern
neighbourhood and develop its assessment and seek to
develop its policy planning tools in this regard. It was
stressed that the preferences and strategic calculations
of local actors were determinant in mediating compli-
ance with EU demands and convergence with EU
standards. Thus, the endeavour should be placed on
gaining greater insights on these preferences and on
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identifying the factors, within the political and economic
structures of the country that shapes them most (e.g.
political regime, state–society relations, conﬁguration of
business interests); this would include getting a sense of
the opaque systems of allegiances and of the role of
informal veto players. A more accurate and more
detailed picture of the situation on the ground and nota-
bly of these countries' domestic conﬁguration, internal
tensions and structural dependencies would allow the EU
to better assist them in reducing their vulnerability to
Russia’s pressure. This increase in EU assessment capaci-
ties is of course easier said than done. Nevertheless,
Brussels could capitalize on different instruments, from a
better coordination, through the European External
Action Service, of member states’ intelligence with the
information from the commission services. It should fos-
ter the creation of epistemic networks involving analysts
and actors from both the EU and these countries.
Notes
1. The six countries concerned by the EaP are: Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
2. It should be noted that EU involvement in the Eastern neigh-
bourhood is not limited to the EaP – the EU presence is also
represented by member states’ foreign policy, CSDP missions or
EU Commission’s delegation – but the emphasis is place on this
initiative as it is the one which provoked a strong reaction from
Russia.
3. On civilian power see (Smith, 2000).
4. See for instance: ‘Russia’s Lavrov lashes EU over new “Eastern
Partnership”’, EUbusiness, 22 March 2009.
5. David Tarr argued however that with a strong political commit-
ment on the part of Russia to work toward reduced nontariff
barriers and trade facilitation the EEU could in fact eventually
bring economic beneﬁts to central Asian countries.
6. President Yanukovych and his government had not hesitated to
make this posture quasi-explicit. In 2010, Ukraine’s EU Affairs
Minister Konstantin Yeliseyev declared to the European media:
‘People in my leadership are extremely pragmatic. If we don’t
have real deliverables from contacts with the EU and we just
see more and more pre-conditions, of course we will have closer
business relations with countries such as Russia, Kazakhstan and
Belarus. In practical terms, our markets will become closer to
Russia’. See: ‘EU risks losing Ukraine, minister warns’, euobserver,
28 April 2010.
7. See for instance: Jana Kobzova and Balazs Jarabik, ‘What is
going on in Ukraine?’, euobserver, 2 December 2013. Their point
seems to be conﬁrmed by the fact that the initial protests
against the rejection of the AA were limited in numbers but
that they grew considerably after the police repression of 30
November 2013. See: ‘Ukraine PM apologises for police crack-
down on protests’, EUbusiness, 3 December 2013.
8. See: ‘Ukraine Economic Imbalances Are Unsustainable, World
Bank Says’, Bloomberg, 7 October 2013.
9. See: Timothy Ash, ‘EU bail out Ukraine? If only it were that sim-
ple’, Financial Times beyondbrics blog, 26 November 2013.
10. Interestingly however, it seems that in an immediate reaction to
the announcement of Ukraine’s government decision on 21
November, the European External Action Service (EEAS) covertly
threatened Kiev that abandoning the AA process was likely to
jeopardize its chances of obtaining an IMF loan, before reverting
to form by simply pointing out in its statement that signing the
AA would have ‘sent a signal to the IMF’ and ‘given momentum’
on the negotiations on a new arrangement (European External
Action Service, 2013). On the previous version of the EEAS dec-
laration, see: ‘EU and Ukraine: What went wrong?’, euobserver,
25 November 2013.
11. See: ‘Ukraine, Russia formalise cheaper gas deal’, Reuters, 9
January 2014.
12. ‘As His Fortunes Fell in Ukraine, a President Clung to Illusions’,
The New York Times, 23 February 2014.
13. This legal incompatibility has been often emphasized by the
EU Commissioner for the Neighbourhood policy Stefan Fuele
(European Commission, 2013).
14. The ﬁnal draft of this article was been submitted on the 2 April
2014.
References
Ademmer, E. and B€orzel, T. A. (2013) ‘Migration, Energy and Good
Governance in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood’, Europe-Asia
Studies, 65 (4), pp. 581–608. doi:10.1080/09668136.2013.766038.
Bordachev, T., Ostrovskaya, E. and Skriba, A. (2013) ‘The Choice and
Challenge of Eurasian Integration’, Russia in Global Affairs,
December.
Cadier, D. (2012) ‘Apres le retour a l’Europe: la politique etrangere
des pays d’Europe centrale’, Politique Etrangere, 3, pp. 573–584.
Cadier, D. and Parmentier, F. (2011) ‘Ou va le Partenariat Oriental?:
L’UE et ses voisins europeens’, Revue du Marche Commun de
L’union Europeenne, pp. 597–602.
Cooper, J. (2013) ‘The Development of Eurasian Economic
Integration’, in R. Dragneva and K. Wolczuk (eds), Eurasian
Economic Integration Law, Policy and Politics. Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar Pub. Ltd., pp. 15–33.
Copsey, N. and Pomorska, K. (2010) ‘Poland’s Power and Inﬂuence in
the EU: The Case of its Eastern Policy’, Comparative European
Politics, 8 (3), pp. 304–326. doi:10.1057/cep.2009.3.
Delcour, L. (2014) ‘Faithful But Constrained? Armenia’s Half-Hearted
Support for Russia’s Regional Integration Policies’, in D. Cadier
(ed.), The Geopolitics of Eurasian Economic Integration, LSE IDEAS
Special Report 19, London: The London School of Economics,
June.
Delcour, L. and Tulmets, E. (2008) Pioneer Europe?: Testing EU Foreign
Policy in the Neighbourhood. Nomos, Baden-Baden.
Dragneva, R. and Wolczuk, K. (2013) ‘The Eurasian Customs Union:
Framing the Analysis’, in R. Dragneva and K. Wolczuk (eds),
Eurasian Economic Integration Law, Policy and Politics.
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Pub. Ltd., pp. 1–12.
European Commission (2004) European Neighbourhood Policy
Strategy Paper, Communication from the European Commission,
COM (2004) 373, Brussels, 12 May.
European Commission (2013) Statement on the pressure exercised by
Russia on countries of the Eastern Partnership by European
Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy Stefan
Fuele, SPEECH/13/687, Brussels, 11 September.
European Council (2008) Extraordinary European Council: Presidency
Conclusions, 12594/2/08 REV 2, Brussels, 6 October.
European External Action Service (2013) Statement by EU High
Representative Catherine Ashton on Ukraine, 131121/04, Brussels,
21 November.
Global Policy (2014) 5:Suppl.1
David Cadier84
Frolov, V. (2005) ‘Democracy by Remote Control’, Russia in Global
Affairs, 3, pp. 171–177.
Gnedina, E. and Sleptsova, E. (2012) Eschewing Choice: Ukraine’s
Strategy on Russia and the EU. Brussels: Centre for European
Policy Studies.
Hassner, P. (2008) ‘One Cold War Among Many?’, Survival, 50(5), pp.
247–256. doi:10.1080/00396330802456569.
Haukkala, H. (2010) The EU-Russia strategic partnership the limits of
postsovereignty in international relations. London and New York:
Routledge.
La€ıdi, Z. (ed.) (2008) EU foreign policy in a globalized world:
normative power and social preferences. London and New York:
Routledge.
La€ıdi, Z. (2007) ‘The Unintended Consequences of European Power’,
Les Cahiers europeens de Sciences Po, 5, pp. 1–24.
Langbein, J. (2013) ‘Unpacking the Russian and EU Impact on
Policy Change in the Eastern Neighbourhood: The Case of
Ukraine’s Telecommunications and Food Safety’, Europe-
Asia Studies, 65(4), pp. 631–657. doi:10.1080/09668136.2013.
766043.
Langbein, J. and B€orzel, T. A. (2013) ‘Introduction: Explaining Policy
Change in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood’, Europe-Asia Studies,
65(4), pp. 571–580. doi:10.1080/09668136.2013.766042.
Lavenex, S. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2009) ‘EU rules beyond EU
borders: theorizing external governance in European politics’,
Journal of European Public Policy, 16(6), pp. 791–812. doi:10.1080/
13501760903087696.
Light, M. (2008) ‘Russia and the EU: Strategic Partners or Strategic
Rivals?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 46(s1), pp. 7–27.
doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.2008.00808.x.
Longhurst, K. and Wojna, B. (2011) Asserting the EU’s Mission in the
Neighbourhood: Ten Recommendations for an Effective Eastern
Partnership. Warsaw: Polish Institute for International Affairs.
Makarychev, A. S. (2008) Rebranding Russia: Norms, Politics and
Power. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.
Manners, I. (2010) ‘As You Like It: EU Normative Power in
the European Neighbourhood Policy’, in R. G. Whitman and
S. Wolff (eds.), The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective:
Context, Implementation and Impact. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, pp. 29–50.
Meister, S. (ed.) (2013) Economization Versus Power Ambitions
Rethinking Russia’s Policy Towards Postsoviet States. Baden-Baden:
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
Putin, V. (2011) ‘New Integration Project for Eurasia: A Future which
is Being Born Today’, Izvestiya,10 October.
Rupnik, J. (ed.) (2007) Les banlieues de l’Europe. Nouveaux Debats.
Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
Sjursen, H. (2013) ‘A foreign policy without a state? Accounting for
the CFSP’, in F. Bynander and S. Guzzini (eds), Rethinking Foreign
Policy. London: Routledge, pp. 123–136.
Smith, K. E. (2000) ‘The end of civilian power EU: a welcome demise
or cause for concern?’, International Spectator, 35(2), pp. 11–28.
Stewart, S. (2014) ‘The EU, Russia and a Less Common Neighbourhood’,
SWP Comments 2014/C 03. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.
Strange, S. (1994) States and markets. London: Continuum.
Tarr, D. G. (2012) The Eurasian Customs Union among Russia, Belarus
and Kazakhstan: Can It Succeed Where Its Predecessor Failed?
(SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 2185517). Rochester, NY: Social
Science Research Network.
Thorun, C. (2009) Explaining change in Russian foreign policy: the role
of ideas in postSoviet Russia’s conduct towards the West.
Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Tocci, N. (ed.) (2008) Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The EU
and its Global Partners. Brussels: Center for European Policy
Studies Paperbacks.
Trenin, D. (2009) ‘Russia’s Spheres of Interest, not Inﬂuence’, The
Washington Quarterly, 32(4), 3–22. doi:10.1080/01636600903231089.
Tsypkin, M. (2009) ‘Russian politics, policy-making and American
missile defence’, International Affairs, 85(4), pp. 781–799. doi:10.
1111/j.1468-2346.2009.00827.x.
Whitman, R. G. and Wolff, S. (2010) ‘Much Ado About Nothing? The
European. Neighbourhood Policy in Context’, in R. G. Whitman and
S. Wolff (eds), The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective:
Context, Implementation and Impact. Basongstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, pp. 3–26.
Wolczuk, K. (2009) ‘Implementation without Coordination: The
Impact of EU Conditionality on Ukraine under the European
Neighbourhood Policy’, Europe-Asia Studies, 61(2), pp. 187–211.
doi:10.1080/09668130802630839.
Zielonka, J. (2008) ‘Europe as a global actor: empire by example?’,
International Affairs, 84(3), pp. 471–484. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.
2008.00718.x.
Author Information
David Cadier is a Fellow in Diplomacy and International Strategy at
LSE IDEAS and a teaching fellow in the International Relations
Department at the LSE.
Global Policy (2014) 5:Suppl.1
EU–Russia Competition and the Ukraine Crisis 85
